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AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES AND POLICE DE-
ESCALATION 
Jordan Blair Woods 
ABSTRACT—Several experts predict that autonomous vehicles will 
become mainstream in the next few decades. Although autonomous vehicles 
will have massive implications for law enforcement, the technology has 
received little to no attention in criminal procedure and policing scholarship. 
This Essay introduces a new vector into the nascent law and policy discourse 
on autonomous vehicles and policing—de-escalation and officer safety. 
Although largely overlooked in this discourse, officer safety is a crucial topic 
given its powerful role in shaping officer training, departmental policies, and 
Fourth Amendment law. 
This Essay argues that autonomous vehicles and their included 
technologies (for instance, sensory technology, real-time high definition 
(HD) mapping, and network connectivity systems) have promise to decrease 
possibilities for escalation during vehicle stops in at least five ways: 
(1) vehicles will be programmed to follow traffic rules, making traffic stops 
much less common; (2) sensory technology will prevent vehicles from 
hitting other vehicles or persons, decreasing motor vehicle assaults against 
officers; (3) driver’s license requirements could be eliminated, taking the 
enforcement of driver’s license laws out of the hands of police; (4) DUI law 
reforms could abolish the need for officers to conduct DUI stops, 
investigations, or arrests; and (5) sensory technology in vehicles will reduce 
investigations associated with hit-and-run offenses, and will simplify 
accident investigations overall. This Essay explores how these potential 
changes have vast implications for Fourth Amendment law, officer training, 
and law enforcement policy on motor vehicle stops. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Driving on roads and highways could soon look radically different. 
Several automotive manufacturers and high-tech companies are investing 
billions of dollars to develop autonomous vehicles (also called self-driving 
cars) for the marketplace.1 Over thirty states have recently enacted 
legislation, and more states are introducing bills, related to autonomous 
vehicles.2 Experts predict that autonomous vehicles will become mainstream 
 
 1 See Danielle Muoio, 19 Companies Racing to Put Self-Driving Cars on the Road by 2021, BUS. 
INSIDER (Oct. 17, 2016, 1:12 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/companies-making-driverless-cars-
by-2020-2016-10 [https://perma.cc/3QRJ-XX93]. 
 2 See Autonomous Vehicles: Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Mar. 19, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-self-
driving-vehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/KBD8-N6UY]. 
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in the next few decades and potentially fully replace human-controlled 
vehicles.3 
As the self-driving car revolution gains speed, tort scholars and 
policymakers are turning their attention to how the new technology will 
transform traffic liability rules and motor vehicle regulations.4 Much less 
attention, however, is being paid to autonomous vehicles and policing. There 
is little to no discussion of autonomous vehicles in existing criminal 
procedure and policing scholarship.5 Most law enforcement agencies are not 
seriously considering or preparing for the new technology,6 and the few 
police chiefs and sheriffs that have considered the issue are largely claiming 
that law enforcement is being left out of major strategic and policy 
discussions on autonomous vehicles.7 
All signs indicate, however, that autonomous vehicles will have 
massive implications for law enforcement. Traffic stops, accident 
investigations, and motor vehicle stops on criminal suspects are major 
components of police work today.8 Currently, traffic stops are the most 
common way that civilians come into contact with the police.9 In the nascent 
discourse on autonomous vehicles and policing, some police chiefs and 
sheriffs are warning that the new technology will largely undermine crime 
 
 3 Kevin Davis, Preparing for a Future with Autonomous Vehicles, POLICE CHIEF MAG. (July 2016), 
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/preparing-for-a-future-with-autonomous-vehicles 
[https://perma.cc/LZ7C-78H7]; Ed Sappin, Will Self-Driving Cars End the Big Automakers?, FORBES 
(Apr. 13, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesnycouncil/2018/04/13/will-self-driving-
cars-end-the-big-automakers/#7d4baa85356d [https://perma.cc/MYM9-USHL]. 
 4 See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer 
Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 105 VA. L. REV. 127, 129 (2019) 
(arguing that autonomous vehicles will necessitate updating manufacturer liability rules); Mark A. 
Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort Liability, Automobile Insurance, and Federal 
Safety Regulation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1611 (2017) (exploring federalism and duty of care questions 
posed by autonomous vehicles); Tracy Hresko Pearl, Hands on the Wheel: A Call for Greater Regulation 
of Semi-Autonomous Cars, 93 IND. L.J. 713, 716 (2018) (arguing that the risks of autonomous vehicles 
in general, and semi-autonomous vehicles in particular, necessitate greater federal regulation). 
 5 See infra Part I; Elizabeth E. Joh, Automated Seizures: Police Stops of Self-Driving Cars, N.Y.U. 
L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1) [hereinafter Joh, Automated Seizures]. 
 6 See Robin Washington, Driverless Cars Are Coming. What Does That Mean for Policing?, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 29, 2016, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/09/29/driverless-cars-are-coming-what-does-that-mean-for-
policing [https://perma.cc/L7G7-V8MA]. 
 7 See, e.g., Pete Bigelow, On the Path to Autonomous Vehicles, Police Officers Get Left Behind, CAR 
& DRIVER (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.caranddriver.com/news/on-the-path-to-autonomous-vehicles-
police-officers-get-left-behind [https://perma.cc/4HH6-2EFL] (noting that not one member of the U.S. 
Department of Transportation’s advisory committee on autonomous vehicles has a law enforcement 
background). 
 8 GARY W. CORDNER, POLICE ADMINISTRATION 28 (Routledge 9th ed. 2016) (1979). 
 9 ELIZABETH DAVIS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 
2015 1 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp15.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DLQ-65NF]. 
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detection and criminal investigations by eliminating pretextual traffic stops,10 
a strategy they consider to be a major crime-fighting tool.11 At the same time, 
curbing traffic stops (especially pretextual ones) could have significant 
benefits for members of minority communities, who are disproportionately 
targeted and harmed by these practices.12 
This Essay introduces an important, yet missing, vector in the 
developing scholarly and policy discourse on autonomous vehicles—de-
escalation and officer safety. To the extent that safety concerns are a focus 
in the current discourse, the emphasis is primarily on drivers and pedestrians, 
not officers.13 This Essay explores how autonomous vehicles and their 
included technologies (for instance, sensory technology, real-time HD 
mapping, and network connectivity systems) have promise to transform 
officers’ interactions with automobiles in ways that reduce the possibility of 
escalation during motor vehicle stops. Society should embrace these 
potential changes because escalation during automobile encounters 
undermines both officer and civilian safety. 
This Essay contends that autonomous vehicles and their included 
technologies can decrease the possibility of escalation during motor vehicle 
stops in at least five ways: (1) vehicles will be programmed to follow traffic 
rules, making traffic stops much less common; (2) sensory technology will 
prevent vehicles from hitting other vehicles or persons, decreasing motor 
vehicle assaults against officers; (3) driver’s license requirements could be 
eliminated, taking the enforcement of driver’s license laws out of the hands 
of police; (4) DUI law reforms could abolish the need for officers to conduct 
DUI stops, investigations, or arrests; and (5) sensory technology in vehicles 
will reduce investigations associated with hit-and-run offenses, and will 
simplify accident investigations overall.14 
In bringing de-escalation and officer safety to the discussion on 
autonomous vehicles and policing, this Essay makes two significant 
contributions. First, it pushes against a growing critique among law 
enforcement leaders that autonomous vehicles are only bad for the police 
 
 10 See Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CALIF. 
L. REV. 199, 209 (2007) [hereinafter Joh, Discretionless Policing] (defining pretextual stops as 
“occasions when the justification offered for the detention is legally sufficient, but is not the actual reason 
for the stop”). 
 11 See Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth 
Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 156 (2017) (noting that a newspaper 
published by the International Association of Chiefs of Police stated that using traffic stops to detect 
criminal activity is “our most effective tool for interdicting criminals”). 
 12 See infra Part I.B. 
 13 See infra Part I.A. 
 14 See infra Part II. 
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because the technology will eliminate pretextual traffic stops, which officers 
currently rely on as a crime-fighting tool.15 This critique misses a critical 
component of the cost-benefit analysis on autonomous vehicles and 
policing—namely, officer safety. Second, this Essay shows that the potential 
safety benefits from autonomous vehicles offer a new platform to improve 
public perceptions of safety in officer training, departmental policies, and 
Fourth Amendment law on motor vehicle stops.16 
Two caveats are in order. First, given that scholars and policymakers 
are just beginning to explore the topic, I recognize that there are many open 
questions about how autonomous vehicles will affect policing. Thus, the 
scope of this Essay is narrow. Its purpose is to expose the potential benefits 
of autonomous vehicles that stem from reducing possibilities for police 
escalation and the implications of this reduction for officer training and 
policing laws and policies.17 
Second, it is important to recognize that the current technology 
surrounding autonomous vehicles is far from perfect.18 Some experts argue 
that it may take years or even decades to overcome current testing and 
 
 15 See infra Part I.B. 
 16 See Jordan Blair Woods, Policing, Danger Narratives, and Routine Traffic Stops, 117 MICH. L. 
REV. 635, 637–39 (2019) [hereinafter Woods, Traffic Stops] (noting that “[t]he narrative that routine 
traffic stops are fraught with danger to the police is longstanding”). In order to stress the dangers of being 
complacent on the scene and hesitating to use force, police academies regularly show officer trainees 
video clips of officers being randomly shot during traffic stops that otherwise appear entirely routine. 
Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1363, 1397–98 & nn.139–44 (2018) 
(discussing the popularity among police officers of videos depicting violence against police officers and 
collecting sources). Courts, including the U.S Supreme Court, consistently assume that routine traffic 
stops pose grave dangers to the police. See, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (quoting 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1983)) (“[T]he Court has recognized that traffic stops are 
‘especially fraught with danger to police officers.’”); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 
(1997) (discussing the danger posed to police officers by passengers of stopped vehicles). Autonomous 
vehicles may help to make clearer what is already true, but widely underappreciated—traffic stops are 
not as perilous for officers as the currently dominant danger narrative suggests. See Woods, Traffic Stops, 
supra note 16, at 640. 
 17 These contributions to the scholarly conversation are necessary due to the significance of officer 
safety in shaping officer training, departmental policies, and Fourth Amendment law. See Woods, Traffic 
Stops, supra note 16, at 637–39 (discussing how danger narratives shape Fourth Amendment law on 
traffic stops); see generally Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 1995, 2068 (2017) (discussing courts’ deference to police expertise); Alice Ristroph, The 
Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1182, 1205–07 (2017) (discussing how courts defer 
to concerns about officer safety). 
 18 See Peter Hancock, Are Autonomous Cars Really Safer Than Human Drivers?, CONVERSATION 
(Feb. 2, 2018, 6:29 AM), https://theconversation.com/are-autonomous-cars-really-safer-than-human-
drivers-90202 [https://perma.cc/9AJ9-EDWE] (discussing the dangers posed by autonomous vehicles). 
See generally HARVEY ROSENFIELD, CONSUMER WATCHDOG, SELF-DRIVING VEHICLES: THE THREAT 
TO CONSUMERS (2017), https://www.consumerwatchdog.org/sites/default/files/resources/self_driving_
consumer_threat_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4MY-ECQY] (discussing criticisms of self-driving cars). 
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validation obstacles for autonomous vehicles to become commonplace.19 
This Essay assumes for the sake of argument that the technology will 
continue to rapidly advance as investment continues20 and will move beyond 
these testing and validation obstacles in the long run. 
Even if it takes decades until autonomous vehicles reach their prime, it 
is important in the current moment to think about how the technology can 
facilitate de-escalation during police encounters. Law enforcement leaders 
have expressed concerns that law enforcement is being left out of the current 
policy and strategy discussions on autonomous vehicles.21 For instance, in 
January 2017 the U.S. Department of Transportation created a twenty-five 
person advisory committee to focus on automated transportation.22 Not a 
single person appointed to the committee was affiliated with law 
enforcement.23 
Thus, now is the time for researchers, industry players, and institutional 
actors that regulate the police (for instance, legislatures, policymakers, and 
law enforcement leaders) to start seriously considering these issues before 
the technology is developed and the moment has passed. Neglecting how 
autonomous vehicles relate to police work can potentially inhibit developing 
the technology in ways that mutually benefit officers and civilians during 
police encounters and motor vehicle stops in particular. 
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I sets the stage by describing major 
themes in the early scholarly and policy discourse on autonomous vehicles 
and policing. Part II discusses five ways that autonomous vehicles and their 
included technologies have promise to reduce escalation during motor 
vehicle stops in ways that benefit officer as well as civilian safety. Finally, 
Part III discusses the broader implications of this de-escalation potential on 
Fourth Amendment doctrine, officer training, and departmental policies 
involving motor vehicle stops. 
 
 19 See generally Philip Koopman & Michael Wagner, Challenges in Autonomous Vehicle Testing 
and Validation, 4 SAE INT’L J. TRANSP. SAFETY 15 (2016) (laying out the validation challenges that must 
be overcome to ensure the safety of autonomous vehicles); see also Aarian Marshall, After Peak Hype, 
Self-Driving Cars Enter the Trough of Disillusionment, WIRED (Dec. 29, 2017, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/self-driving-cars-challenges [https://perma.cc/6WDQ-DU6M] (discussing 
when autonomous vehicles may become commonplace). 
 20 See Muoio, supra note 1 (demonstrating that multiple car manufacturers and technology 
companies are devoting substantial capital to developing autonomous vehicles). 
 21 See Bigelow, supra note 7. 
 22 Advisory Committee on Automation in Transportation (ACAT), U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Apr. 13, 
2017), https://www.transportation.gov/acat [https://perma.cc/B8TL-LN32]. 
 23 ACAT Member Profiles, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Jan. 11, 2017), 
https://www.transportation.gov/acat/members [https://perma.cc/T953-5RQ5] (listing members and 
affiliations of the advisory committee). 
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I. AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES AND POLICING 
This Part outlines major themes in the early scholarly and policy 
discourse on autonomous vehicles and policing. Importantly, the topic of de-
escalation and officer safety is missing from these early discussions. 
 
A. Traffic Safety 
There is growing agreement among scholars and policymakers that 
autonomous vehicles will considerably improve traffic safety.24 Autonomous 
vehicles will be programmed to comply with traffic laws, and built-in sensors 
are expected to prevent collisions with other vehicles or people.25 According 
to the latest available data, in 2016 there were 7,277,000 police-reported 
motor vehicle traffic crashes.26 Over 3.1 million people were injured and 
37,461 people were killed in those crashes.27 The number of traffic accidents 
are predicted to decline with the use of autonomous vehicles,28 resulting in 
fewer injuries and fatalities.29 
Almost one-third of traffic crash fatalities involve alcohol-impaired 
drivers.30 In 2017 alone, there were 10,874 fatalities caused by alcohol-
impaired driving.31 Some advocates stress that autonomous vehicles could 
end the problem of drunk driving by removing human drivers from the 
vehicle’s control.32 Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), for instance, 
 
 24 See Geistfeld, supra note 4, at 1615 (discussing expected traffic safety benefits of autonomous 
vehicles). 
 25 Harry Surden & Mary-Anne Williams, Technological Opacity, Predictability, and Self-Driving 
Cars, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 137–38 (2016); Jay L. Zagorsky, Cops May Feel Biggest Impact from 
Driverless Car Revolution, CONVERSATION (Mar. 16, 2015, 5:39 AM), https://theconversation.com/cops-
may-feel-biggest-impact-from-driverless-car-revolution-38767 [https://perma.cc/JZU7-P24R]. 
 26 NHTSA’S NAT’L CTR. FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 
POLICE-REPORTED MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC CRASHES IN 2016 1 (2018), 
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812501 [https://perma.cc/XJJ3-DHX8]. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Zagorsky, supra note 25. 
 29 Geistfeld, supra note 4, at 1611. 
 30  NHTSA’S NAT’L CTR. FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 
ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED DRIVING: 2017 DATA 1 (2018), 
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812630 [https://perma.cc/J9EJ-LNPJ]. 
“Alcohol-impaired” means that a driver’s blood alcohol concentration was 0.08 g/dL or above. Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 See, e.g., Katherine L. Hanna, Comment, Old Laws, New Tricks: Drunk Driving and Autonomous 
Vehicles, 55 JURIMETRICS 275, 276 (2015); Ryan Gallagher, Drinking & Riding? DUIs in the Age of Self-
Driving Cars, DMV.ORG (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.dmv.org/articles/alcohol-and-self-driving-cars 
[https://perma.cc/BW5P-W5DQ]. 
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recently released a statement emphasizing that autonomous vehicles “hold 
incredible potential to completely eliminate drunk driving.”33 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
estimates that human error causes approximately 94% of serious traffic 
accidents.34 Common errors include distraction, sleep deprivation, and 
intoxication.35 Early testing indicates that autonomous vehicles will 
drastically reduce these errors by largely removing human drivers from the 
vehicles’ operation.36 
For instance, in 2009, Google started its self-driving car project, which 
has since developed into an autonomous car development company called 
Waymo.37 Since testing started in 2009, Waymo’s vehicles have clocked 
more than 10 million miles on routes frequented by pedestrians without 
being involved in one fatal accident.38 Waymo has reported approximately 
three dozen non-fatal accidents since testing began.39 Notably, the company 
attributes these accidents primarily to human error and not the autonomous 
vehicles.40 In 2017, Waymo announced that it began testing autonomous cars 
 
 33 MADD Statement on Autonomous Vehicle Technology, MADD (Sept. 14, 2017), 
https://www.madd.org/press-release/madd-statement-autonomous-vehicle-technology 
[https://perma.cc/B72A-VMEQ]. 
 34 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., BUDGET ESTIMATES: FISCAL 
YEAR 2018 1 (2018), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/fy2018-nhtsa_cj-
05162017-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EKV-RZ6B]. 
 35 Surden & Williams, supra note 25, at 128. 
 36 Automated Vehicles for Safety, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 
https://www.nhtsa.gov/technology-innovation/automated-vehicles-safety [https://perma.cc/R78P-
F3YX] (discussing benefits of autonomous vehicles). 
 37 Our Journey, WAYMO, https://waymo.com/journey [https://perma.cc/6AL9-27TJ]. 
 38 Kirsten Korosec, Waymo’s Self-Driving Cars Hit 10 Million Miles, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 10, 2018), 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/10/10/waymos-self-driving-cars-hit-10-million-miles 
[https://perma.cc/4QKP-3K5R]; Race to Robot Cars Continues After Fatal Crash, YAHOO! (Mar. 28, 
2018), https://sports.yahoo.com/race-robot-cars-continues-fatal-crash-080430856.html 
[https://perma.cc/4KNF-GPXG] (quoting Waymo’s CEO John Krafcik). 
 39 Currently, California is the only state that requires autonomous vehicle developers to submit 
collision reports. Jack Stewart, Why People Keep Rear-Ending Self-Driving Cars, WIRED (Oct. 18, 2018, 
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/self-driving-car-crashes-rear-endings-why-charts-statistics 
[https://perma.cc/P7F9-ZSW7]. As of June 2019, Waymo has filed nine collision reports for 2019. 
Waymo filed twenty-five collision reports for 2018, one report for 2017, and zero reports for 2016. Report 
of Traffic Collision Involving an Autonomous Vehicle (OL 316), STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR 
VEHICLES, https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/vr/autonomous/autonomousveh_ol316 
[https://perma.cc/QM85-48YR]. Between 2009 and 2015, Waymo reported sixteen crashes. Matt Richtel 
& Conor Dougherty, Google’s Driverless Cars Run into Problem: Cars with Drivers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/technology/personaltech/google-says-its-not-the-
driverless-cars-fault-its-other-drivers.html [https://perma.cc/8BCR-Z2VP]. 
 40 Richtel & Dougherty, supra note 39. 
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without a safety driver in the driver’s seat,41 bringing us one step closer to 
fully autonomous vehicles. 
These expected traffic safety benefits of autonomous vehicles are 
directly relevant to law enforcement. FBI statistics show that vehicle-related 
accidents account for most accidental law enforcement officer deaths.42 In 
2017, forty-seven officers were accidentally killed in the line of duty—
thirty-five of whom were involved in motor vehicle crashes and six of whom 
were pedestrian officers struck by vehicles.43 The number of officers who 
suffer non-fatal injuries during traffic accidents each year is much greater.44 
In addition, a major part of police work today involves traffic 
enforcement, including responding to and investigating traffic accidents.45 
Each year, law enforcement officers issue tens of millions of traffic 
citations.46 With autonomous vehicles being programmed to follow the rules 
of the road, researchers stress that autonomous vehicles will reduce the need 
for law enforcement to spend vast human and financial resources on 
enforcing traffic laws.47 
B. Criminal Law Enforcement 
Another key issue is whether the new technology will undermine 
policing by significantly reducing or eliminating traffic stops, especially 
 
 41 Andrew Krok, Waymo Ditches Safety Drive Self-Driving Public Pilot, CNET (Nov. 7, 2017, 8:00 
AM), https://www.cnet.com/roadshow/news/waymo-ditches-safety-driver-in-self-driving-public-pilot 
[https://perma.cc/UFA4-2RZ5]. 
 42 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Are Most Job-Related Deaths of Police Caused by Traffic Incidents?, 
WASH. POST (July 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/07/12/are-
most-job-related-deaths-of-police-caused-by-traffic-incidents/?utm_term=.91b2a4bcc8a0 
[https://perma.cc/AGJ4-Q5MS]. 
 43  CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2017: LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED AND ASSAULTED tbl.65 (Type of Accident and Activity of Victim 
Officer at Time of Incident, 2013–2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2017/tables/table-65.xls 
[https://perma.cc/E46U-QNWF]. 
 44 See generally Tom LaTourrette, Risk Factors for Injury in Law Enforcement Officer Vehicle 
Crashes, 38 POLICING: INT’L J. OF POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 478, 478 (2015) (studying risks police 
officers face from traffic accidents on the job). 
 45 CORDNER, supra note 8, at 28. 
 46 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD DIGEST: 2016 DATA 16 (2018), 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/National-Overview-
2016/SCCD_2016.ashx [https://perma.cc/HX9H-CZZB] (reporting that the total incoming traffic 
violations/caseloads reported by state courts between 2007 and 2016 ranged from 44.9 million to 56.3 
million cases per year; COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE 
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 31 (2012), 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSP_DEC.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/3CF7-ATB5]. 
 47 Zagorsky, supra note 25. 
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pretextual ones.48 Pretextual traffic stops enable officers to use a traffic 
violation as a justification to pull over vehicles when their true motivations 
are to investigate unrelated crimes.49 If autonomous vehicles are programmed 
to follow traffic rules, then there will be much fewer traffic violations for 
officers to use as pretexts for vehicle stops, which could improve citizen and 
officer safety alike.50 
Some commentators stress that communities of color could benefit in 
major ways if autonomous vehicles end or significantly curb pretextual 
traffic stops.51 Pretextual traffic stops are a pervasive and institutionalized 
law enforcement practice today.52 A long line of legal scholarship criticizes 
pretextual traffic stops for enabling racial profiling on roads and highways, 
and increasing opportunities for law enforcement to question, seize, search, 
and apply force to minority drivers and passengers.53 Studies show that 
people of color bear the brunt of intrusive police conduct and its attendant 
harms during pretextual traffic stops.54  
Some law enforcement leaders, however, have advanced two 
counterarguments that relate to the role of traffic stops as a crime-fighting 
tool.55 First, they argue that if autonomous vehicles eliminate or significantly 
 
 48 Dan Fink, Autonomous Cars: Driving on Auto Pilot, POLICE MAG. (June 22, 2014), 
http://www.policemag.com/channel/vehicles/articles/2014/06/autonomous-cars-driving-on-auto-
pilot.aspx [https://perma.cc/8B9D-JSUT]. 
 49 Carbado, supra note 11, at 130; Joh, Discretionless Policing, supra note 10, at 209; L. Song 
Richardson, Implicit Racial Bias and the Perpetrator Perspective: A Response to Reasonable but 
Unconstitutional, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1008, 1014 (2015). 
 50 Dorothy J. Glancy, Autonomous and Automated and Connected Cars—Oh My! First Generation 
Autonomous Cars in the Legal Ecosystem, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 619, 663 (2015) [hereinafter 
Glancy, Autonomous and Automated]; Washington, supra note 6. 
 51 Martine Powers, Could Self-Driving Cars Be One Solution to Police Shootings During Traffic 
Stops?, WASH. POST (July 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-
gridlock/wp/2016/07/12/could-self-driving-cars-be-one-solution-to-police-shootings-during-traffic-
stops/?utm_term=.2b1bbd1498a9 [https://perma.cc/V3RH-UBDJ]. 
 52 Carbado, supra note 11, at 155–56 (noting how law enforcement agencies are “very much aware 
of the on-the-ground implications of Whren”). In Whren v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected 
the idea that pretextual traffic stops violate the Fourth Amendment. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
 53 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002); 
Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997); Samuel R. Gross & 
Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 651 (2002); David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme 
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997). 
 54 See Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Targeting Young Men of Color for Search and Arrest During 
Traffic Stops: Evidence from North Carolina, 2002–2013, 5 POL., GROUPS & IDENTITIES 107 (2017); see 
also, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Criminal Procedure and the Good Citizen, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 653, 690 
(2018). 
 55 See, e.g., Ian Adams & Arthur Rizer, Self-Driving Cars Could Change Landscape of Policing, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Dec. 23, 2016, 2:00 PM), 
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reduce traffic stops (especially pretextual ones), then law enforcement will 
have much fewer opportunities to detect criminal activity, investigate crime, 
and apprehend criminal suspects.56 Second, they claim that traffic stops are 
visible reminders to society that the police has a public presence,57 and thus 
deter crime.58 In their view, autonomous vehicles would weaken this alleged 
deterrent by eliminating or significantly reducing traffic stops.59 One of the 
major open questions, however, is what a “traffic stop” might look like and 
whether police will continue the practice with autonomous vehicles.60 
Scholars are starting to consider how autonomous vehicles could 
engender major shifts in policing strategies away from traffic enforcement. 
Autonomous vehicles will have the capacity to record various types of data, 
including past locations.61 Therefore, as Professor Orin Kerr has 
hypothesized, autonomous vehicles could give rise to greater law 
enforcement reliance on car trips to reconstruct past events during criminal 
investigations.62 With this potential, scholars and commentators warn that 
autonomous vehicles could facilitate government surveillance in ways that 
create new forms of discrimination and privacy abuse.63 In this regard, 
autonomous vehicles could become a new site of big data policing.64 
Scholars and law enforcement leaders have also started exploring how 




 56 Davis, supra note 3. 
 57 Zagorsky, supra note 25. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Joh, Automated Seizures, supra note 5 (discussing what traffic stops might look like when officers 
stop autonomous vehicles). 
 61 Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1171, 1196 (2012) 
[hereinafter Glancy, Privacy] (discussing implications of this recorded data). 
 62 Orin Kerr, Opinion, How Self-Driving Cars Could Determine the Future of Policing, WASH. POST: 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2017/06/16/how-self-driving-cars-could-determine-the-future-of-
policing/?utm_term=.376af6e02653 [https://perma.cc/NF3G-PAHN]. 
 63  DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE/STRATEGIC ISSUES GROUP, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
AUTONOMOUS CARS PRESENT GAME CHANGING OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 2 (2014) [hereinafter FBI REPORT]; Lindsey Barrett, Note, Herbie Fully Downloaded: 
Data-Driven Vehicles and the Automobile Exception, 106 GEO. L.J. 181, 184 (2017); Chasel Lee, Note, 
Grabbing the Wheel Early: Moving Forward on Cybersecurity and Privacy Protections for Driverless 
Cars, 69 FED. COMM. L.J. 25, 38–39 (2017). 
 64 See generally ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, 
RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 1–6 (2017) (describing big data policing). 
 65 ROBERT FINKELSTEIN & ROB DAVIS, POLICE FOUNDATION, AUTONOMOUS CARS FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 6, (2017), https://www.techcastglobal.com/wp-
content/uploads/ckfinder/userfiles/files/White%20Paper%20Mod%201%20Autonomous%20Cars%20L
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instance, criminals might use unoccupied autonomous vehicles to 
anonymously transport illegal drugs or weapons.66 Or terrorists might use 
unoccupied autonomous vehicles to drive explosives or chemical weapons 
into public spaces and buildings.67 Self-driving cars might also bring changes 
to the underground commercial sex industry by providing new spaces for 
people to buy and sell sex.68 
Cybersecurity is another related issue. Experts stress that smart 
criminals could hack and use autonomous vehicles to execute their criminal 
plans.69 For instance, they might hijack the control systems of autonomous 
vehicles to exceed speed limits and evade the police.70 Other experts, 
however, stress that autonomous vehicles may not be as vulnerable to 
hacking in the future, especially as industry collaborations and cybersecurity 
features improve with the progression of the technology.71 
* * * 
In sum, there is growing consensus among stakeholders that 
autonomous vehicles have considerable benefits for traffic safety. Some law 
enforcement leaders, however, are concerned that these benefits will come 
at the cost of impairing police work by making crime detection and criminal 
investigations more difficult. Important for the purposes of this Essay, de-
 
aw%20Enforcement%202%20March%2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NJZ-8NFS] (noting that 
“[a]utonomous vehicles will make possible new kinds of crimes and criminals”). 
 66 FBI REPORT, supra note 63, at 1 (describing that autonomous vehicles “open up greater 
possibilities . . . for a car to be more of a potential lethal weapon than it is today”); Davis, supra note 3; 
Joseph J. Kolb, Will Autonomous Vehicles Improve Highway Safety?, 1 POLICEONE DIG. EDITION, Spring 
2018, at 8, 11, https://publications.policeone.com/2018/P1_DigitalEdition_HighwaySafety_
Spring2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ3X-RSKL]. 
 67 James Black, Commentary, Autonomous Vehicles: Terrorist Threat or Security Opportunity?, 
RAND CORP. BLOG (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/01/autonomous-vehicles-terrorist-
threat-or-security-opportunity.html [https://perma.cc/VCD2-L8HZ]. Stakeholders are already 
considering potential solutions to terrorist threats from unoccupied autonomous vehicles. For instance, a 
patent application was recently filed for a built-in detection system that could detect the presence of 
hazardous materials in autonomous vehicles and disable the autonomous features of the vehicles when 
potential weapons of mass destruction are detected. U.S. Patent App. No. 14/521866, (filed Oct. 23, 
2014). 
 68 Danielle Paquette, People Are Going to Sell Sex in Driverless Cars, Researchers Say, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/11/12/people-are-going-sell-sex-
driverless-cars/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8bcb876fe3ae [https://perma.cc/Y683-C2CD]. 
 69 See, e.g., Rob Toews, The Biggest Threat Facing Connected Autonomous Vehicles Is 
Cybersecurity, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 25, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/25/the-biggest-threat-
facing-connected-autonomous-vehicles-is-cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/YXK2-9CA8]. 
 70 FINKELSTEIN & DAVIS, supra note 65, at 6. 
 71 See, e.g., Alex Hern, Assume Self-Driving Cars Are a Hacker’s Dream? Think Again, GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 30, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/30/self-driving-cars-
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escalation and officer safety are not a focus of these discussions on 
autonomous vehicles and policing. 
II. AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES AND POLICE DE-ESCALATION 
This Part examines five ways that autonomous vehicles and their 
included technologies (for instance, sensory technology, real-time HD 
mapping, and vehicle connectivity systems) have promise to reduce 
possibilities for escalation during motor vehicle stops: (1) vehicles will be 
programmed to follow traffic rules, making traffic stops much less common; 
(2) sensory technology will prevent vehicles from hitting other vehicles or 
persons, decreasing motor vehicle assaults against officers; (3) driver’s 
license requirements could be eliminated, taking the enforcement of driver’s 
license laws out of the hands of police; (4) DUI law reforms could abolish 
the need for officers to conduct DUI stops, investigations, or arrests; and (5) 
sensory technology in vehicles will reduce investigations associated with hit-
and-run offenses, and will simplify accident investigations overall. 
A. Traffic Stop Occurrences 
As society moves towards autonomous vehicles programmed to follow 
traffic rules, many moving traffic violations will disappear.72 With fewer 
traffic violations, it is expected that traffic stops will significantly decline.73 
In turn, there will be fewer traffic stops to escalate into violence.74 
At the same time, autonomous vehicles might not eliminate all traffic 
violations. Two possible exceptions are registration and equipment 
violations (for example, driving with a broken headlight or taillight). For this 
reason, it is important to consider other ways that autonomous vehicles could 
facilitate police de-escalation besides simply decreasing the volume of traffic 
stops. 
B. Motor Vehicle Assaults and Fleeing Drivers 
Autonomous vehicles have the potential to reduce the dangers officers 
face when interacting with fleeing motorists or approaching stopped 
vehicles. A key feature of autonomous vehicles is that built-in sensors will 
largely prevent collisions with other vehicles or people.75 This will 
 
 72 Brian Fung, How Driverless Cars Could Kill the Speeding Ticket — and Rob Your City, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/01/22/how-driverless-
cars-could-kill-the-speeding-ticket-and-rob-your-city/?utm_term=.78b911388835 
[https://perma.cc/8A7G-TYPQ]. 
 73 Glancy, Autonomous and Automated, supra note 50, at 661–62. 
 74 Elizabeth E. Joh, Automated Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 559, 560 (2018). 
 75 Surden & Williams, supra note 25, at 137–38; Zagorsky, supra note 25. 
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significantly undermine the ability of motorists to intentionally hit officers 
or occupied patrol cars with motor vehicles. In related work, I have shown 
that the motor vehicle is a commonly described assault weapon against 
officers during traffic stops that escalate into violence against the police.76 
Autonomous vehicles prompt related questions about whether 
technological features other than anti-collision sensors can de-escalate police 
encounters involving fleeing motorists. On this issue, the direction of the 
technology is admittedly less clear. Perhaps law enforcement officers will be 
empowered to shut off autonomous vehicles at their own discretion.77 
Assuming it does not violate the Fourth Amendment,78 this ability could 
prevent motorists from fleeing or hitting officers or patrol cars while 
attempting to flee. 
There has already been some industry pushback, however, against 
granting officers this authority. For instance, reports recently surfaced that 
U.S. transportation regulators had a closed-door meeting in March 2018 
during which they grappled with whether police officers should be 
empowered to disable autonomous vehicles during an emergency.79 A thirty-
nine-page report from the meeting revealed that participants were skeptical 
to allow this because of the possibility that hackers or terrorists could exploit 
the same features that would allow police to stop autonomous vehicles.80 
Even if officers will not be empowered to automatically shut off 
autonomous vehicles for legal or political reasons, the direction of the 
technology could shape the moments before officers apprehend fleeing 
motorists. If autonomous vehicles are programmed to follow legal speed 
limits, then officers could simply follow motorists that flee in autonomous 
vehicles until the drivers eventually stop, without assuming the risk of being 
hit. Or if officers are able gain access to an autonomous vehicle’s GPS data 
 
 76 Jordan Blair Woods, Policing, Danger Narratives, and the Motor Vehicle (manuscript on file with 
author) [hereinafter, Woods, Motor Vehicle] (discussing how the motor vehicle as a weapon source is 
underappreciated in policing data); see also Woods, Traffic Stops, supra note 16, at 673 & n.166 
(presenting results from an empirical study on violence against the police during traffic stops showing 
that after personal weapons (hands/fists/feet), the motor vehicle was the second most commonly described 
weapon used to assault officers during routine traffic stops for only traffic violations, and the most 
commonly described weapon used to assault officers during traffic stops that involved criminal 
enforcement beyond a traffic violation). 
 77 Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing Police Robots, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 516, 529 n.77 (2016) 
(noting the possibility that police officers would be able to shut off autonomous vehicles). 
 78 See generally Joh, Automated Seizures, supra note 5 (examining the Fourth Amendment 
implications of automated traffic stops on autonomous vehicles). 
 79 David Shepardson, U.S. Regulators Grappling with Self-Driving Vehicle Security, REUTERS 
(July 10, 2018, 2:22 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-selfdriving/u-s-regulators-grappling-
with-self-driving-vehicle-security-idUSKBN1K02OD [https://perma.cc/4A4Q-XBZC]. 
 80 Id. 
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in real-time, then officers may not need to follow fleeing motorists at all.81 
High-speed police pursuits, considered to be an inherently dangerous aspect 
of policing,82 could significantly decline, if not disappear. 
Technological features in autonomous vehicles may also address officer 
safety concerns when they approach stopped vehicles, such as being 
assaulted with car doors.83 In 2016, Jaguar Land Rover filed a patent 
application for a new system that uses sensors in car door handles and 
elsewhere around the car in order to prevent the car doors from denting.84 
The sensors work by detecting how close a car is to an obstacle (for instance, 
other vehicles, lampposts, pillars, or walls) before calculating how far the car 
door can open.85 A mechanism built into the car door then increases 
resistance the closer it gets to an object, making it harder to open the car door 
quickly and cause damage.86 The system also includes signals, such as 
indicator lights, to alert others that a door is about to open.87 
These sensory systems could make it more difficult for motorists in 
autonomous vehicles to open their doors to intentionally hit officers. If 
incorporated into windows, the technology could also make it more difficult 
for motorists to intentionally close their windows on officers’ arms and 
hands. In addition, the alerts could give officers more time to move out of 
the way and avoid these types of assaults. 
C. Unlicensed Drivers 
Autonomous vehicles could produce radical changes in driver’s license 
laws and perhaps make driver’s licenses obsolete.88 The logic is that if human 
 
 81 FBI REPORT, supra note 63, at 2. 
 82 See, e.g., John Hill, High-Speed Police Pursuits: Dangers, Dynamics, and Risk Reduction, FBI L. 
ENFORCEMENT BULL., July 2002, at 14, 15. 
 83 Michael Schlosser, Unknown and Known Risk Vehicle Stops, POLICE MAG. (July 13, 2018), 
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8NJC] (discussing the driver’s door as “the most critical” observation point when officers approach 
stopped vehicles during traffic stops). 
 84 Richard Gray, Sensors in Doors Promise an End to Car Park Dings, TIMES (London) (Dec. 12, 
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 88 See Fink, supra note 48 (speculating that prospective future smart car owners will have to attend 
computer class training in place of obtaining a driver’s licenses); Doug Newcomb, You Won’t Need a 
Driver’s License by 2040, WIRED (Sept. 17, 2012, 1:42 PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/09/ieee-
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drivers are not required to take control of autonomous vehicles, then there is 
no need to require a driver’s license.89 
These reforms are politically feasible.90 In 2017, Georgia enacted 
legislation amending the state motor vehicle code to exempt drivers of fully 
autonomous vehicles from driver’s license requirements.91 In October 2016, 
California released a draft of regulations on autonomous vehicles, which 
stated that the most advanced autonomous vehicles would no longer be 
required to have a licensed driver if and when federal officials deem them 
safe enough.92 
In prior work, I discuss that these invocations of police authority are 
central to why many traffic stops on unlicensed drivers today escalate into 
assaults against officers.93 These driver’s license reforms would eliminate the 
authority for officers to initiate traffic stops based on driving with an invalid 
license. In addition, an invalid license would no longer be a justification for 
officers to order drivers out of cars, detain, or arrest drivers, thus reducing 
the potential for escalation into violence. 
 
 89 See sources cited supra note 88 and accompanying text. But see Jennifer Bradley, Will You Need 
a Driving Licence in the Age of Self-Driving Cars?, BBC (July 31, 2017), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40570592 [https://perma.cc/54FH-7S56] (arguing that until cars 
are fully autonomous, licensing requirements for self-driving cars should remain for safety reasons). 
 90 See Autonomous Vehicles, supra note 2 (discussing each state’s autonomous vehicle related bills). 
 91 S.B. 219, 2017 Ga. Laws 549, codified in part at GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-21 (West 2017); see also 
W. Perry Hicks & Alan J. Ponce, SB 219 – Autonomous Vehicles, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 231, 240–43 
(2017) (discussing Georgia’s amendments). 
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opens-pathway-for-cars-that-lack-steering-wheel-2016-9 [https://perma.cc/62CR-Y9PE]. Relatedly, in 
October 2018, the California DMV issued its first permit to allow the testing of driverless vehicles. See 
State of Cal. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, DMV Issues Permit Authorizing Waymo to Test Driverless Vehicles 
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https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/newsrel/2018/2018_81 [https://perma.cc/38NC-6T8T]. 
 93 Woods, Motor Vehicle, supra note 76 (presenting results from an empirical study on violence 
against the police during traffic stops finding that approximately 40% of stops that escalated into non-
fatal assaults against officers involved drivers who did not have a valid driver’s license); Woods, Traffic 
Stops, supra note 16, at 690 (presenting results from an empirical study on violence against the police 
during traffic stops finding that invocations of police authority for not having a valid driver’s license was 
a major factor surrounding stops that escalated into violence against officers). 
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D. Intoxicated Drivers 
Every year, there are over one million arrests for driving under the 
influence (DUI) in the United States alone.94 If autonomous vehicles can 
transport intoxicated occupants without requiring them take control of the 
vehicles, then public safety will no longer be a valid justification to ban 
operating a vehicle while intoxicated or allow officers to conduct DUI stops, 
investigations, or arrests.95 
In prior work, I describe that these invocations of police authority are 
central to why many traffic stops on intoxicated drivers today escalate into 
assaults against officers.96 Each step of the DUI investigation process—from 
the initial questioning, to ordering the driver out of the vehicle to conduct the 
roadside exercises, to the undertaking of the roadside exercises, to the arrest, 
to the transporting of the intoxicated driver to the testing facility, to the 
transporting of the intoxicated driver to jail—opens opportunities for the 
encounter to escalate into violence against the police (as well as civilians). If 
intoxicated drivers no longer pose a public safety threat with autonomous 
vehicles, then perhaps the only basis upon which officers can initiate stops 
on intoxicated drivers will be to help those in need of assistance. 
These reforms have not yet emerged in the United States, and officers 
are still arresting drivers for DUI-related offenses when driving semi-
autonomous cars on autopilot.97 There are calls for these reforms, however, 
in the international arena. For instance, in October 2017, the National 
Transport Commission of Australia recommended that laws against driving 
under the influence no longer apply to occupants in autonomous vehicles 
 
 94  MATTHEW CHAMBERS ET AL., BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DRUNK 
DRIVING BY THE NUMBERS (2017), 
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 95 See, e.g., Jeffrey K. Gurney, Driving into the Unknown: Examining the Crossroads of Criminal 
Law and Autonomous Vehicles, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 393, 422 (2015) (arguing that if an 
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 97 See, e.g., Kevin Kelleher, Man Arrested for Drunk Driving After Officers Found Him Asleep in 
Tesla Running in Autopilot Mode, FORTUNE (Dec. 1, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/11/30/man-arrested-
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with high or full automation.98 Accordingly, the extent to which these DUI 
law reforms gain support in the United States will likely depend on the level 
of automation that self-driving cars achieve.99 
E. Hit-and-Run and Accident Investigations 
Traffic enforcement also includes responding to and investigating hit-
and-run offenses and traffic accidents.100 Sensory technology in autonomous 
vehicles should reduce hit-and-run incidents and motor vehicle accidents 
more generally. In turn, investigations surrounding hit-and-run offenses and 
motor vehicle accidents will decline, reducing opportunities for those 
investigations to escalate into violence against officers. 
* * * 
Autonomous vehicles and their included technologies hold promise to 
decrease possibilities for escalation during motor vehicle stops in ways that 
benefit officer as well as civilian safety. Illuminating these potential benefits 
illustrates the importance of considering officer safety as a vector in the 
growing scholarly and policy discourse on autonomous vehicles. These 
potential benefits regarding de-escalation, however, also have meaningful 
implications for policing laws, policies, and practices. The Essay now shifts 
gears to discuss these issues. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF DE-ESCALATION 
This Part considers the implications of autonomous vehicles’ potential 
to decrease possibilities for escalation on Fourth Amendment doctrine, 
officer training, and departmental policies. 
A. Fourth Amendment 
It is beyond the scope of this Essay to provide a truly comprehensive 
analysis of the various ways in which autonomous vehicles will test the 
bounds of Fourth Amendment protection. The technology, however, will 
challenge engrained assumptions about the dangerousness of motor vehicle 
stops to law enforcement officers in existing Fourth Amendment law. To 
illustrate this point, this Part focuses on one prime example: officers’ use of 
deadly force during motor vehicle stops.101 Several courts, including the U.S. 
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Supreme Court, have rejected Fourth Amendment claims of excessive force 
and upheld officers’ use of deadly force against suspects fleeing in motor 
vehicles.102 As explained below, their reasoning commonly turns on the 
belief that the vehicles’ drivers posed a reasonable threat to officers and the 
public at large. 
Consider the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Scott v. Harris.103 In this 
case, a Georgia county deputy tried to pull over a speeding driver.104 The 
driver refused to pull over, sped away, and a high-speed chase began. The 
deputy radioed to report the pursuit and the driver’s license plate number. 
Deputy Scott overheard the report and joined the pursuit with other officers. 
During the chase, the driver pulled into the parking lot of a shopping center 
and was nearly boxed in by various patrol cars. The driver evaded the trap 
by making a sharp turn, collided with Deputy Scott’s patrol car, exited the 
parking lot, and sped off again down a two-lane highway. Deputy Scott then 
took over as the lead pursuit vehicle and decided to terminate the pursuit by 
using a precision immobilization technique (PIT)—which involves making 
contact with a fleeing suspect’s car, and when effective, causes a loss of tire 
traction and the engine to shut down.105 After receiving permission to execute 
the PIT maneuver, Deputy Scott applied his push bumper to the rear of the 
driver’s vehicle.106 The driver then lost control of his vehicle, which 
overturned and crashed. The driver was badly injured and was rendered a 
quadriplegic. 
The driver filed a Section 1983 suit alleging that Deputy Scott used 
excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.107 The Court, however, held that Deputy Scott did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment because his decision to terminate the pursuit by 
bumping into the back of the driver’s car was objectively reasonable.108 
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In its analysis, the Court first distinguished the case from its prior 
decision in Tennessee v. Garner,109 stressing that the threat posed by an 
unarmed suspect fleeing by foot is not “even remotely comparable to the 
extreme danger to human life” posed by the driver in the case at hand.110 In 
balancing the nature of the individual intrusion against the importance of the 
relevant governmental interests, the Government pointed to ensuring public 
safety, which the Court characterized as “paramount.”111 The Court then 
stressed that the driver “posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of 
any pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian motorists, and 
to the officers involved in the chase.”112 It concluded that Deputy Scott’s 
actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the driver 
intentionally put himself and the public in danger by refusing to stop during 
the high-speed pursuit, whereas the bystanders and officers who were at risk 
of harm during the pursuit were entirely innocent.113 
More recently, the Court followed the logic in Scott to reach its 
unanimous decision in Plumhoff v. Rickard.114 In this case, an Arkansas 
police officer pulled over a car for only having one headlight.115 The officer 
asked the driver if he had been drinking and the driver responded that he had 
not. The driver failed to produce his driver’s license upon request and 
appeared nervous. The officer then asked the driver to exit the car. Rather 
than comply with the officer’s request, the driver sped away. 
The officer chased the driver, and five other officers soon joined the 
pursuit on an interstate. The vehicles attained speeds of over 100 miles per 
hour and the officers passed more than two dozen other vehicles during the 
chase. The driver eventually exited the interstate and made a quick right turn, 
which caused his car to make contact with one of the patrol cars. The contact 
caused the driver’s car to spin out into a parking lot and collide with another 
officer’s police car. In danger of being cornered, the driver put his car into 
reverse. The two officers then exited their patrol cars, and one who had a gun 
in his hand pounded on the passenger’s window. The driver’s car then made 
 
 109 471 U.S. 1 (1985). In Tennessee v. Garner, the Court held that an officer’s use of deadly force 
against a suspect violates the Fourth Amendment “unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the 
officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical 
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old Edward Garner, a home burglary suspect, in the back as he was fleeing on foot. The officer used 
deadly force in spite of being “reasonably sure” that Garner was unarmed and not dangerous. Id. at 3–4. 
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contact with another patrol car. The driver’s tires were still spinning after 
contact, suggesting that his foot was on the accelerator. One of the officers 
then fired three shots into the driver’s car. The driver then reversed the car 
and maneuvered onto another street, which forced one of the officers to step 
out of the way to avoid the vehicle. As the driver fled down the street, two 
other officers fired twelve shots towards the driver’s car. The driver then lost 
control of the car and crashed into a building. Both the driver and the 
passenger died from some combination of the gunshot wounds and the crash 
that ended the chase. 
The driver’s surviving daughter brought a Section 1983 suit alleging 
that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.116 The Court, however, held that the officers’ conduct did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.117 It reasoned that the driver’s reckless 
driving patterns during the chase posed “a grave public safety risk.”118 It 
further stressed that at the moment the shots were fired, the driver was intent 
on resuming his flight, which would “pose a deadly threat for others on the 
road.”119 The Court underscored that “it was beyond serious dispute” that the 
driver’s flight posed a public safety risk, and therefore, as in Scott, the 
officers acted reasonably to end that risk.120 It further reasoned that the firing 
of fifteen shots in total was reasonable because the driver never abandoned 
his attempt to flee while the shots were fired.121 
Reimagine both U.S Supreme Court cases with autonomous vehicles. 
The facts and analysis of Scott and Rickard could look very different. 
Starting with Scott, the Georgia county deputy attempted to pull the driver 
over for speeding.122 If autonomous vehicles are designed to follow legal 
speed limits, then the underlying traffic violation would never have occurred. 
The officers then chased the fleeing vehicle, which they nearly boxed in with 
various patrol cars.123 The driver evaded the trap by colliding with Deputy 
Scott’s patrol car. If sensory technology prevents vehicles from colliding 
with other vehicles or persons, then the driver would not have been able to 
hit Deputy Scott’s patrol car. In addition, if the driver’s vehicle would have 
automatically shut down after it was boxed in by various patrol cars, then the 
officers could have apprehended the driver without using such force. 
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Deputy Scott then terminated the pursuit by hitting the rear of the 
driver’s vehicle.124 The Court upheld Deputy Scott’s use of deadly force by 
stressing that the driver posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of 
other motorists, the officers involved in the chase, and pedestrians.125 If 
sensory technology prevents vehicles from colliding with other vehicles or 
persons, then this assumption no longer holds. Thus, if the car in Scott was 
an autonomous vehicle, not only would the pursuit, the collision, and the use 
of deadly force likely not have occurred to begin with, but even if the events 
unfolded the same way, the Court would not have been able to rely on the 
same assumptions. 
Now reimagine the facts in Rickard. In Rickard, the officer pulled over 
a vehicle for only having one headlight.126 Unlike moving violations, 
equipment violations may still exist when autonomous vehicles are the 
norm.127 The driver failed to produce his driver’s license, refused the officer’s 
order to exit the car, appeared nervous, and drove away.128 Driver’s licenses 
may be a relic of the past if autonomous vehicles do not require drivers to 
take control of the vehicles.129 As a result, the officer might never have 
ordered the driver out of the car and the driver might not have gotten nervous 
or fled for not having a valid driver’s license. 
A high-speed pursuit then ensued, with the patrol and driver’s vehicles 
reaching speeds of over 100 miles per hour.130 If autonomous vehicles are 
programmed to follow legal speed limits, then the driver’s vehicle would not 
have been able to attain such high speeds. The driver then made a quick right 
turn, which caused his car to spin out of control in a parking lot and collide 
with another officer’s police car. Sensory technology in the vehicle could 
have prevented this impact. The officers then exited their patrol car, 
approached the driver’s car, and the driver drove into another patrol car and 
appeared to keep his foot on the accelerator. Sensory technology could have 
also prevented this second contact and neutralized any threat the driver posed 
by keeping his foot on the accelerator. The driver then reversed the car and 
maneuvered his car onto another street, which forced another officer to step 
out of the way to avoid being hit. Sensory technology could have also 
neutralized any threat that the officer would have been hit. 
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It is at this time that the officers fired twelve shots towards the driver’s 
car.131 In upholding the officers’ use of deadly force, the Court specifically 
emphasized that the driver’s reckless driving posed “a grave public safety 
risk.”132 It further stressed that this risk was “beyond serious dispute.”133 
Reimagining the facts of the case with a fully autonomous vehicle suggests 
that the chase would not have unfolded as it did, the officers would not have 
fired the twelve shots, and that the Court would not have ruled that the 
driving posed a safety risk. 
A skeptical reader could argue that the Court may move in the opposite 
direction and declare that any stop on an autonomous vehicle is reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment. At the same time, autonomous vehicles could 
give rise to mass automated traffic stops that open new possibilities for the 
Court to rethink the bounds of Fourth Amendment reasonableness in traffic 
stop contexts.134 Although these legal questions regarding the inception of 
traffic stops on autonomous vehicles are open to debate, the analysis above 
regarding the potential for the technology to reduce escalation prompts novel 
questions about the legitimacy of upholding invocations of police authority 
(for instance, use of force) during stops on autonomous vehicles based on 
officer safety grounds. Put another way, as the dangers that motor vehicles 
pose to officers during police encounters shift with autonomous vehicles, so 
must Fourth Amendment law that upholds police conduct during traffic stops 
based on these danger assumptions. 
B. Law Enforcement Policies and Officer Training 
This Section discusses how autonomous vehicles’ potential to reduce 
possibilities for police escalation will challenge the underlying logic of 
standard departmental policies and common approaches to officer training 
on motor vehicle stops. Shifts in officer training are already unfolding in 
some jurisdictions. In 2017, Waymo (the company now leading Google’s 
self-driving car project) started collaborating with law enforcement agencies 
in Arizona, California, Texas, and Washington to educate agencies on how 
to identify and access autonomous vehicles for the purpose of accident 
investigations.135 These training initiatives, however, have yet to touch on 
traffic or criminal enforcement stops. 
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1. Pretextual Traffic Stops 
It is especially important to consider how autonomous vehicles could 
affect departmental policies and practices surrounding pretext stops given 
that the technology could have very significant consequences for society’s 
most marginalized and over-policed communities. On one hand, there will 
be a transition period during which both autonomous and conventional 
vehicles share the road. Turning a blind eye towards policing issues could 
enable autonomous vehicles to become a new proxy to separate low-income 
and wealthier civilians,136 and thus exacerbate pretextual stops against 
society’s most marginalized groups based on race and class. 
On the other hand, the rise of autonomous vehicles could create new 
space to reconsider law enforcement policies and practices involving 
pretextual traffic stops. If autonomous vehicles are programmed to follow 
traffic rules then there will be much fewer traffic violations for officers to 
use as pretexts for vehicle stops.137 With this shift in traffic, law enforcement 
agencies could prohibit officers from conducting pretextual traffic stops in 
general, or on drivers who have access to the technology (which should 
increase as self-driving cars become more commonplace). In this regard, the 
spread of autonomous vehicles might force police practices on pretextual 
traffic stops to change even if the law on pretextual traffic stops does not. 
Some law enforcement leaders, however, are advancing concerns that 
eliminating traffic stops will decrease opportunities for police to discover 
evidence of crime.138 They further claim that traffic stops are visible 
reminders to society that the police has a public presence, and thus 
autonomous vehicles will eliminate a deterrent to crime. The analysis in the 
previous Part, however, illustrates that this critique misses a critical 
component of the cost-benefit analysis on autonomous vehicles and 
policing—namely, officer safety.139 
If autonomous vehicles pressure law enforcement agencies to stop 
conducting pretextual traffic stops, then officers will need to justify vehicle 
stops for unrelated crime based on independent, requisite suspicion. 
Departmental policies on pretextual traffic stops, however, do not always 
require officers to have this independent suspicion. Rather, many policies 
simply internalize the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v. United 
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States, which upheld pretextual traffic stops under the Fourth Amendment 
so long as officers have probable cause of a traffic violation.140 
Consider the policy from a law enforcement agency in Tampa, 
Florida.141 The policy includes a firm statement against using “race, ethnic 
origin, gender, age, economic status, or sexual orientation of an individual” 
as an independent factor or reason for initiating a traffic stop and other 
enforcement efforts.142 The policy also includes a statement that traffic stops 
“should be based on a standard of reasonable suspicion or probable cause as 
required by the Fourth Amendment.”143 It further states that officers must 
base a traffic stop on “reasonable and articulable facts. These facts, when 
viewed through the eyes of a trained and experienced law enforcement 
officer must be sufficient to cause him/her to believe that criminal activity 
or civil violations have occurred, or are about to occur, without regard” for 
the identity characteristics listed above.144 Yet critically, the policy does not 
mandate a higher evidentiary bar that prohibits officers from conducting 
pretextual traffic stops for the purpose of investigating unrelated crimes. 
In allowing officers to initiate pretextual traffic stops without adequate 
information about an unrelated crime, pretextual traffic stops distort and 
obfuscate the true dangers of vehicle stops in ways that undermine both 
officer and civilian safety.145 Accordingly, autonomous vehicles could 
encourage departmental polices and police practices that require officers to 
gather more information about suspected non-traffic crime during vehicle 
encounters than they might gather in today’s driving regime when pretextual 
traffic stops are a fast and reliable tool at their disposal. Better information 
could enhance officers’ ability to accurately evaluate the risks of danger 
during the stops they conduct on autonomous vehicles and thus enhance 
officer safety and standards of criminal investigations.146 
2. High-Speed Pursuits and Immobilization Techniques 
Autonomous vehicles will also challenge the logic of departmental 
policies and officer training on high-speed pursuits. Some researchers have 
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gone so far as to argue that “the car chase will be a thing of the past” when 
autonomous vehicles are the norm.147 
Calls for law enforcement agencies to adopt policy restrictions on high-
speed vehicle chases go back decades148 and persist today.149 Geoffrey 
Alpert’s groundbreaking research in the 1980s called attention to the fact that 
most high-speed vehicle pursuits result from an observed traffic violation, 
not a serious crime.150 In 1990, the U.S. Department of Justice described 
these pursuits as “the most dangerous of all ordinary police activities.”151 
Since then, many law enforcement agencies have adopted policies that 
restrict when officers can engage in high-speed vehicle pursuits.152 
To illustrate how autonomous vehicles and related vehicle technologies 
might affect pursuit policies, consider the following example from the 
Florida Highway Patrol (FHP).153 The FHP pursuit policy begins by stressing 
that its purpose is to balance the benefits of potentially apprehending 
suspects with the risks associated with the pursuit, and stresses that vehicular 
pursuits of fleeing suspects “present a danger to the public, officers and 
suspects involved in the pursuit.”154 The policy then states that officers are 
only authorized to initiate pursuits of suspects whom they reasonably believe 
have committed a felony, reckless driving, or DUI.155 It authorizes officers 
to exceed “maximum speed limits so long as life or property is not 
endangered.”156 When deciding whether to initiate or continue a pursuit, the 
policy directs officers to weigh several factors including: “[t]he seriousness 
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of the violator’s original offense”; “the immediate threat to the safety of law 
enforcement or the public”; “[t]he likelihood of apprehension”; “the time, 
day, and location of the pursuit”; “weather and roadway condition[s]”; 
“[p]resence and volume of other vehicular or pedestrian traffic”; 
“[f]amiliarity with the roadways and the area”; pursuit speeds; and evasive 
tactics by the violator.157 In addition, the policy authorizes officers to deploy 
pursuit termination devices (PTDs) when a driver refuses to stop158 as well 
as use precision immobilization techniques (PITs) to terminate the pursuit.159 
The extent to which this pursuit policy aligns with the nature of driving 
with autonomous vehicles is questionable. If vehicles are programmed to 
follow traffic rules and sensory technology prevents impact with other 
vehicles and persons, then fleeing vehicle suspects may not present as great 
of a danger to the public or law enforcement as they do today. The basis upon 
which officers are authorized to initiate pursuits may also shift. For instance, 
the policy above authorizes vehicle pursuits on DUI suspects, but DUI laws 
could shift if autonomous vehicles can safely transport intoxicated occupants 
without requiring them to take control of the vehicle.160 
The factors that the policy directs officers to weigh before initiating or 
continuing pursuits may also become irrelevant. If it is possible to track 
autonomous vehicles while they are moving,161 then it might be much more 
difficult for violators to evade the police, which increases the likelihood of 
their apprehension. Or, if autonomous vehicles are programmed to follow 
traffic rules and include effective anti-collision sensors, then the time, day, 
or location of the pursuit; pursuit speeds; weather and roadway conditions; 
and the presence and volume of other vehicular traffic become irrelevant. 
Relatedly, autonomous vehicles may also call policies surrounding PIT 
maneuvers into question. Researchers and law enforcement leaders have 
characterized PIT maneuvers as an extremely dangerous tactic.162 If sensors 
built into autonomous vehicles prevent contact with other vehicles, then 
merely boxing in a fleeing autonomous vehicle could be sufficient to stop it 
without requiring officers to assume the risk of ramming patrol cars into the 
vehicle. Alternatively, researchers are already testing the possibility of using 
unoccupied autonomous police cars to conduct PIT maneuvers on fleeing 
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vehicles, removing the dangers of conducting PIT maneuvers to law 
enforcement officers entirely.163 Or, if officers can legally override the 
control system of an autonomous vehicle on their own or by communicating 
with a third party agent,164 then officers would no longer have to use PIT 
maneuvers to stop the vehicle. Accordingly, the technology could open a 
need to revamp departmental policies surrounding PIT maneuvers and may 
even render these policies obsolete. 
3. The Use of Violent Examples of Traffic Stops in Officer Training 
Today, police academies regularly show officer trainees videos of the 
most extreme cases of violence during traffic stops in order to stress that 
everyday police work can quickly turn deadly if the officers become 
complacent on the scene and hesitate to use force.165 These extreme cases 
usually involve officers who are unexpectedly shot during traffic stops that 
at first seemed entirely unremarkable and routine.166  
In previous work, I have argued that the very low proportion of violence 
involving the use of guns or knives against officers during routine traffic 
stops calls into question the use of these violent examples during officer 
training.167 If autonomous vehicles can be programed to follow traffic rules 
and routine traffic enforcement no longer has the same place in police work 
as it does now, then the reasons for using these extreme cases during officer 
training become even more dubious. 
Importantly, danger narratives surrounding traffic stops often focus on 
the moment the officer approaches the stopped vehicle.168 Consistent with 
this idea, many law enforcement agencies have departmental policies 
surrounding traffic stops that include specific guidance on approaching the 
vehicle. Consider an example from Florida’s highway patrol department.169 
The guidance begins by stressing that “[a]pproach to the vehicle should be 
made in a manner that affords the member maximum protection.”170 It then 
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offers guidance on how officers should approach the vehicle, where the 
officers should stand, what officers should say to the drivers and passengers 
when standing next to the stopped vehicle, and how to obtain necessary 
documents from the vehicle occupants to complete the stop.171 
Consider how this policy applies to autonomous vehicles. Sensory 
technology will make it much more difficult for drivers to use their cars to 
intentionally hit officers who approach.172 In addition, sensory technology 
could prevent officers from being struck by oncoming traffic while 
approaching stopped vehicles. These advancements could reduce fears and 
anxieties surrounding the motor vehicle as a source of danger to officers 
during traffic stops, which shape officer training and best practices today on 
how officers should approach stopped vehicles.173 
In fact, officers may not even need to approach stopped vehicles in 
order to complete traffic stops if autonomous police cars become the norm.174 
For instance, in January 2018, Ford filed a patent application for an 
autonomous police car, which could remotely issue traffic citations and 
pursue vehicles without face-to-face interaction between officers and 
stopped motorists.175 The autonomous police car could wirelessly connect to 
the stopped car and communicate with the driver, verify the identity of the 
driver, and issue a citation.176 It could also pursue a fleeing vehicle, track its 
location, and capture photos and video that could later be used as evidence.177 
The autonomous police car would be able to keep a record of what transpired 
during an encounter and wirelessly transmit that record to relevant 
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government agencies.178 Ford’s patent application states that the autonomous 
police car could perform tasks with or without human officers inside the 
vehicle.179 
Imagine if police agencies deployed autonomous police cars like the 
one described in Ford’s patent application. Any communication between an 
officer and a stopped driver could occur through wireless communications 
between the autonomous police car and the stopped autonomous vehicle.180 
The autonomous police car would be able to identify traffic violators, receive 
images of required documents (including driver’s licenses to the extent that 
they are still required), and tell stopped occupants through vehicle-to-vehicle 
communication when they are free to leave.181 Thus, autonomous vehicles 
will neutralize dangers at the moment officers approach a stopped vehicle—
the most dangerous moment, as portrayed in officer training. This may result 
in less extreme examples of violence used in training, potentially leading to 
police officers generally feeling safer on patrol, and a decrease in escalated 
situations. 
CONCLUSION 
The research in this Essay helps to fill the gap in the scholarly and 
policy discourse on autonomous vehicles and policing by introducing de-
escalation and officer safety as a new vector in the conversation. Of course, 
there are many open questions about the direction of autonomous vehicles 
and the various legal dilemmas that the technology could pose. Nevertheless, 
policymakers and scholars must consider how autonomous vehicles will 
affect police work so that the technology can develop in ways that mutually 
benefit officers and civilians during police encounters. This Essay illustrates 
the need to explore and embrace the potential of autonomous vehicles as 
tools of police de-escalation to enhance both officer and civilian safety 
during police encounters. 
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